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ARTICLES

PPL, the Foreign Tax
Credit, and the Gitlitz
‘‘Finger’’ Principle
By Stanley I. Langbein, Esq.
University of Miami School of Law
Coral Gables, Florida

I
In May 2013, the U.S. Supreme Court decided PPL
Corp. v. Commissioner.1 The decision upheld a foreign tax credit for the United Kingdom’s so-called
‘‘windfall tax.’’ The decision was unanimous, and represents an extraordinarily liberal reading of the statutory provisions and regulations governing the foreign
tax credit.
The ‘‘windfall tax’’ was imposed on certain entities,
mostly electric utilities, that had been ‘‘privatized’’
during the 1980s by the Conservative governments
under Prime Ministers Margaret Thatcher and John
Major. The Labour Party regained control of the
United Kingdom government in 1997, after 18 years
of Conservative rule. Parliament then enacted the
windfall tax. The windfall tax was computed by first
determining the average daily profits of the companies
during a four-year testing period; multiplying that by
nine; multiplying that figure by the number of days in
the year (365), to determine the proper ‘‘capital
value’’ of the company as of the date on which the
company was privatized. From that amount was subtracted the ‘‘flotation value’’ of the company, that is,
the price paid by shareholders at the time of privatization. The resulting number was the ‘‘tax base’’; it was
subject to taxation at a statutory rate of 23%.
Justice Thomas’s opinion for the Court holds ‘‘that
the predominant character of the windfall tax is that
of an excess profits tax, a category of income tax in
the U.S. sense.’’2 The Court notes that the parties
stipulated that the tax could be calculated according to
the following formula:
1
2

133 S. Ct. 1897 (2013).
Id. at 1897, 1903.

(1)
Tax = 23% [(365 × (P / D × 9) − FV]
where P is the aggregate profits over the four-year
test period, D the number of days in the period, and
FV the flotation value. If one assumes that for most
companies, the D in this equation is 1,461, the number of days in a four-year period, then this formula
can be re-expressed, eliminating the D and the number 365, as follows:
(2)
Tax = 23% [(P / 4 × 9) − FV]
The Court noted that this equation can be rearranged by simple algebraic manipulation to read as
follows:
(3)
Tax = 51.7% × {P − [(FV / 9) × 4.0027]}
The Court then stated that this presented the tax as
a tax on actual (excess) profits earned — the tax base
was essentially the profits during the four-year period
in excess of ‘‘allowable’’ profits on the invested capital (flotation value):
As noted, FV represents the value at which
each company was privatized. FV is then
divided by 9, the arbitrary ‘price-to-earnings
ratio’ applied to every company. The economic effect is to convert flotation value into
the profits a company should have earned
given the assumed price-to-earnings ratio.
See 135 T.C., at 327 (‘‘‘In effect, the way the
tax works is to say that the amount of profits
you’re allowed in any year before you’re
subject to tax is equal to one-ninth of the
flotation price. After that, profits are deemed
excess, and there is a tax’’’ (quoting testimony from the treasurer of South Western
Electricity plc)). The annual profits are then
multiplied by 4.0027, giving the total ‘acceptable’ profits (as opposed to windfall
profit) that each company’s flotation value
entitled it to earn during the initial period
given the artificial price-to-earnings ratio of
9. This fictitious amount is finally subtracted
from actual profits, yielding the excess profits, which were taxed at an effective rate of
51.71%.3
And Justice Thomas noted, unassailably but with
two inevitable qualifications, that this expression represented the essence of a windfall profits tax:
3

Id. at 1897, 1904–05 (emphasis in original).
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The rearranged tax formula demonstrates
that the windfall tax is economically equivalent to the difference between the profits
each company actually earned and the
amount the Labour government believed it
should have earned given its flotation value.
For the 27 companies that had 1,461-day
initial periods, the U.K. tax formula’s substantive effect was to impose a 51.71 percent
tax on all profits earned above a threshold.
That is a classic excess profits tax. See, e.g.,
Act of Mar. 3, 1917, ch. 159, Tit. II, §201,
39 Stat. 1000 (8% tax imposed on excess
profits exceeding the sum of $5,000 plus 8%
of invested capital).
Of course, other algebraic reformulations of
the windfall tax equation are possible.4
The difficulty suggested by the first emphasized
words in the quoted passage above was that there
were 32 companies subject to the tax, and only 27 operated in privatized form for the full 1,461 days in the
four-year period. For companies with short periods,
the tax applied by taking their profits for such periods
during their first four years that they were in operation as private companies, and projecting that the
profits earned in that period would be earned over
four years. The capital value derived based on those
projected profits was then offset by the flotation value
to arrive at the base which was subjected to tax at
23%. When two of the five ‘‘outlier’’ companies were
analyzed, the statutory formula could still be ‘‘rearranged’’ as done by the Court opinion, but the tax rate
on the ‘‘tax base’’ exposed by the rearrangement exceeded 100%, in one case substantially so. This presented difficulties under provisions of the regulations,
the validity of which no one contested, which determine whether a tax qualifies as an income tax based
on the ‘‘predominant character’’ of the tax. Peculiarly,
although this is a critical question, the Court explicitly refrained from expressing any view as to its ‘‘merits’’:
An amici brief argues that because two companies had initial periods substantially
shorter than four years, the predominant
character of the U.K. windfall tax was not a
tax on income in the U.S. sense. See Alstott
Brief 29 (discussing Railtrack Group plc and
British Energy plc). The argument amounts
to a claim that two outliers changed the predominant character of the U.K. tax. See 135
T.C. 304, 340, n. 33 (2010) (rejecting this
view).

The Commissioner admitted at oral argument
that it did not preserve this argument, a fact
reflected in its briefing before this Court and
in the Third Circuit. See Tr. of Oral Arg.
35–36; Opening Brief for Appellant and Reply Brief for Appellant in No. 11-1069
(CA3). We therefore express no view on its
merits.5
Justice Sotomayor concurred in the decision, but
wrote a separate concurring opinion, in which she
noted that taking the ‘‘outliers’’ into account changed
the predominant character analysis, and changed the
outcome. But, she said, because the government had
taken the position at argument that the outliers should
be disregarded, and the point was pressed only by
amici, she would ‘‘reserve consideration’’ of the argument for ‘‘another day’’:
The Court’s conclusion that the windfall tax
is a creditable excess profits tax under 26
U.S.C. §901(b)(1) depends on two interrelated analytic moves: first, restricting the
‘predominant character’ analysis to those
companies that shared an ‘initial period’ of
rate regulation of 1,461 days; and second,
treating the tax’s initial period variable as
fixed. See ante, at 9–10. But there is a different way of looking at this case. If the predominant character inquiry is expanded to
include the five companies that had different
initial periods, especially those with much
shorter initial periods, it becomes impossible
to rewrite the windfall tax as an excess profits tax. Instead, it becomes clear that the
windfall tax is functionally a tax on value.
But because the Government took the position at oral argument that the predominant
character inquiry should disregard such
‘outlie[r]’ companies, see Tr. of Oral Arg.
38–39, and this argument is therefore only
pressed by amici, Brief for Anne Alstott et
al. as Amici Curiae 28–30 (hereinafter Alstott Brief), I reserve consideration of this
argument for another day and another context and join the Court’s opinion.6
Justice Sotomayor’s opinion accepted the Court’s
‘‘rearrangement’’ as showing that for the 27 companies with 1,461-day periods, the tax was equivalent to
a tax of 51.71% of windfall profits, subject to a credit
equal to 44.47% of invested capital. But her opinion
set forth details with respect to the five ‘‘outliers.’’ For
5

4

Id. at 1897, 1905 (emphasis in original).

6

Id. at 1897, 1905 n.6.
Id. at 1897, 1905, 1907.
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three of these companies, the ‘‘effective’’ tax rate on
excess profits, and the effective percentage of flotation
value that constituted the ‘‘credit’’ did not differ substantially from the percentages generated by the 27
‘‘non-outlier’’ companies. For a fourth, which had an
initial period of 260 days, however, the tax rate would
have been 290.60% and the threshold rate 7.91%, but
Justice Sotomayor’s opinion says that this company
paid no tax, for reasons the opinion does not discuss.
The fifth company, however, Railtrack Group, which
Justice Sotomayor’s opinion emphasized, had a tax
rate of 239.10% and threshold rate of 9.62%.
But the fact that Justice Sotomayor was ‘‘persuaded’’ by the argument did not affect her final decision:
At oral argument, the Government apparently rejected the notion that ‘outliers’ like
Railtrack Group are relevant to creditability
analysis. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 35–39. The
Government also did not argue these outliers’ relevance before the Court of Appeals,
ante, at 14, n. 6, and so this argument, and
the regulatory interpretation it depends upon,
has only been presented to this Court by
amici, see Alstott Brief 17–18, 28–30. We
are not barred from considering statutory and
regulatory interpretations raised in an amicus
brief, but we should be ‘reluctant to do so,’
Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 457, n.
(1994, 114 S. Ct. 2350, 129 L. Ed. 2d 362),
when the issue is one of first impression and
the Federal Government has staked out what
appears to be a contrary position. Thus,
while I find this argument persuasive, I do
not base my analysis of this case on it and
therefore concur in the Court’s opinion.7
As this was only the second time the Supreme
Court has decided a case involving the foreign tax
credit, and the first in 75 years, and only the second
Supreme Court decision of any international tax issue
in those 75 years, it is not clear when Justice Sotomayor expects ‘‘another day’’ when her convictions
can be brought to bear. Still cloudier was what she
conceived could possibly constitute another ‘‘context’’ in which the question could be revisited.
It is submitted here that even the Court’s ‘‘rearrangement’’ of the windfall tax statutory formula is
impermissible under the regulations (and any other
authority interpreting the statute). The statute and
regulations condition the creditability of the tax exclusively upon the foreign tax base as defined by the foreign tax law, and, in particular, do not permit taking
7

Id. at 1897, 1905.

into account the foreign tax rate as defined by the foreign tax law. Considerations concerningthe latter matter are the province of the §904(a)8 foreign tax credit
limitation, not the ‘‘creditability’’ determination. This
means that both algebraic reformulations of foreign
statute prescriptions, and defense of foreign provisions by reference to the ‘‘nonconfiscatory’’ nature of
their rates, are to be avoided.
And while algebraic reformulations of indefinite
significance should be avoided, an algebraic analysis
of the foreign tax structure is in order to determine if
the base it reaches will in the ‘‘predominant’’ case be
coextensive with, or at least intersect, the base subject
to the United States tax. And such an analysis of the
windfall tax demonstrates that the nominal base of
that tax in the normal case extends beyond profits or
income ‘‘in a United States sense.’’ And the proof is
that the record in PPL demonstrated that many of the
companies at issue — far more than the one, two, or
five which may have constituted ‘‘outliers’’ — enjoyed profits during the four-year test period that were
lower than the ‘‘base’’ which was subjected to the
23% tax.
Moreover, while the analysis of the ‘‘outliers’’ is
not, in my judgment, the conclusive question, it
would, as it apparently did for Justice Sotomayor, lead
to the proper issues on the basis of which the windfall
tax should have been found to be noncreditable. The
Court’s and Justice Sotomayor’s reluctance to decide
the case on the basis of issues not fully presented is
understandable. But the Court was not forced to do
that. If the issue is as serious as Justice Sotomayor
held it to be, and as Justice Thomas’s avoidance of it
seemed to confirm, the Court could have ordered the
matter rebriefed or reargued, or, at the extreme could
have remanded, either to the Court of Appeals or the
Tax Court, for consideration or reconsideration of the
issue.
The Court’s opinion will have unfortunate consequences for the tax system as a whole and for the administration of the foreign tax credit in particular. As
to the latter, the decision is rife with opportunity for
‘‘gaming’’ by foreign legislators and administrators, at
potentially heavy expense to noncorporate, and nonmultinational corporate, American taxpayers. As to
the former, the decision — especially if read in connection with certain earlier but recent decisions of the
Court, and particularly with earlier opinions of Justice
Thomas — could signal the beginning of an era in
which the Internal Revenue Service will bear an especially heavy burden in connection with virtually all
tax controversies, a burden which tax advisors may
8
All section (‘‘§’’) references are to the U.S. Internal Revenue
Code of 1986, as amended, or the regulations thereunder, unless
otherwise indicated.
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have the tricky task of taking into account in advising
clients in respect of virtually all tax matters.
II
Let us take first, analysis of the correspondence of
the ‘‘base’’ of the windfall tax to the profits actually
earned by the companies during the four-year test period.
We can begin by noting that, in the Court’s and taxpayer’s ‘‘rearrangement’’ of the statutory formula, the
tax rate is nonconfiscatory (51.7%) solely because the
tax rate is 23%, and that rate is less than 44.44%. At
a rate of 44.44% or greater, the theoretical tax rate under the ‘‘reconstructed’’ excess profits tax would be
more than 100%. The opinions of the Supreme Court
(as well as those of the lower courts) strongly suggest,
though they do not hold, that this would not pass muster under the creditability rules, and one would certainly hope this would be so.
We can be a bit more formal by taking the generic
case of a tax defined as was the windfall tax, which
takes the aggregate profits (P) over a number of periods (we will assume this is years hereafter) (n), and
capitalizes them at a capitalization rate (k), to determine a ‘‘fair value’’ (V). V is then reduced by an
amount of invested capital (K), and subjected to a tax
rate (r).
Equation (1) above then is expressed as:
(4)
r(V − K) = r[ (P/n) * k) − K]
And the ‘‘rearrangement’’ expressed in Equation
(2) would look like this:

k
r (V - K) = [(r ) ` n j] # [P - (n/k) # K]

(5)

In other words, what Justice Sotomayor calls the
‘‘effective tax rate’’ under the reconstructed windfall
tax rate is the ratio of the capitalization rate to the period used (9⁄4 in the case of the windfall tax) multiplied by the nominal statutory tax rate (51.75% is 9⁄4
of 23%). What she calls the threshold rate is the reciprocal of the coefficient applied to the nominal rate
to get the effective rate, i.e., 4⁄9 in the case of the
windfall tax, times the invested capital (flotation
value). It follows that if the ‘‘nominal’’ or statutory
tax rate is greater than the ratio of the number of periods to the capitalization rate, i.e., greater than 4⁄9
(44.44%) in the case of the windfall tax, the ‘‘effective rate’’ will be greater than one (100%), i.e., the tax
will be confiscatory. This would be true generally
with respect to any capitalization rate and period used.
In an article9 published after the argument in PPL
but before the decision, I took this analysis further to
9

Langbein, ‘‘Doing the Math (and the English) in the Windfall

ask the question which I believe the current regulations, the statute, and all prior authority under §901
and its predecessors ask, viz., the correspondence between the nominal tax base of a tax structured in this
manner (V − K) and actual profits during the tested
period (P). The abiding assumption, which there is no
reason to question in the case of the windfall tax, is
that P represents ‘‘net gain,’’ income or profits as conceived by the United States law, ‘‘in a United States
sense,’’ or under the regulations, there being no difference for these purposes in these varying formulations.
The question is whether the foreign tax is ‘‘aimed’’
only at net gain, or at something else, or, more particularly, something more.
The algebra is simple, as presented in my earlier article, but is worth repeating briefly here.
We introduce a variable, which we will call r, as the
average annual pre-WFT profit rate during the fouryear testing period, meaning the percentage that the
average profit earned (P/4) during the four years is of
the original flotation value (FV). We can show that, so
long as the average annual profit rate during the fouryear period was below 20%, the base of the WFT (not
the tax liability) would be less than or equal to the aggregate profits for the four-year period. The equations
are simplified by getting rid of the ‘‘dailiness’’ computation, we determine the threshold at which the base
of the windfall tax is equal to the aggregate profit. Let
P be the aggregate profit; PMV, the profit making
value; FV, the flotation value; and r the annual profit
rate. The equation we wish to solve is as follows, and
denote the tax base as TB:
(6)
TB = PMV − FV =P
Representing that the aggregate profit for the fouryear period is four times the average annual profit:
(7)
P = 4 × (r × FV)
and the ‘‘profit-making’’ value is nine times the average annual profit during the four-year period (r ×
FV), or:
(8)
PMV = 9 × (r × FV)
So, plugging equations (7) and (8) into equation
(6), we get:
(9)
(9r × FV) − FV = 4r × FV
which resolves to:
(10)
9r − 1 = 4r
This means that r is equal to 1⁄5, or 20%. If this is
set up as an inequality, it means that for an r greater
than one-fifth, the base of the WFT (excess of ‘‘profitmaking’’ value over flotation value) will be greater
than the aggregate profits for the four-year period. Beyond this, the method of the tax — capitalizing profits over a period of years at a fixed rate, and deductTax Cases,’’ 42 Tax Mgmt. Int’l J. 134 (Mar. 2013).
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ing invested capital — will generate a ‘‘break even’’
point with respect to any capitalization rate, and any
period over which profits were calculated. The ‘‘break
even’’ point will simply be the reciprocal (1 divided
by the number) of the difference between the capitalization multiplier and the number of years in the period. Thus, suppose you wanted the rate of return to
be 5% (a capitalization rate of 20), and you used only
one year in the period. The profit rate at which you
taxed an amount in excess of profits would be 1⁄19, or
5.263%. In other words, suppose the FV were 100,
and the profits in the one year were 10, the tax base
(100: 20 times 10 (200) minus 100) would greatly exceed actual profits (10). If the profits were 5.263, the
tax base would be 20 times 5.263 times (105.26) over
100, or 5.26, exactly equal to profits for the year (or
close enough for government work).
But as it turns out, the nominal base of the foreign
tax will be less than or equal to profits at the point at
which the annual profit rate (P/n) is less than or equal
to the reciprocal of the arithmetic excess of the capitalization rate over the number of periods used in determining a ‘‘fair’’ capital value. Thus, in the general
case the ‘‘breakeven profit rate’’ is [1/(k − n)]. In the
case of the windfall tax, that point is 1/(9 − 4), or 1⁄5,
or 20%.
The regulations provide that a foreign tax satisfies
the realization requirement of the regulations if it is
imposed ‘‘[u]pon or subsequent to the occurrence of
events (‘realization events’) that would result in the
realization of income under the income tax provisions
of the Internal Revenue Code.’’10 For 23 of the 31
companies involved, this was not the case: they were
subject to tax on something other than events that
would have resulted in the realization of income under the Code prior to the time the tax was imposed.
What the Supreme Court’s decision amounts to saying, in terms of an analysis of the foreign ‘‘base,’’ is
that if one can identify a tax rate, less than 100%, but
greater than the nominal statutory foreign rate, such
that the foreign base, when multiplied by the ratio of
the nominal rate to the rate so identified, is less than
or reasonably congruent with the United States base,
then the foreign tax is creditable, notwithstanding that
the base as defined by the foreign law is generally,
characteristically, and substantially in excess of the
United States base. In terms of the windfall tax, the
identified rate is 51.75%, and ratio of the statutory
rate to that rate is 4⁄9. Thus, so long as 4⁄9 of the base
defined for foreign tax purposes is reasonably congruent with the United States base, the tax qualifies. This
mode of analysis is radically different from any in
10
Regs. §1.901-2(b)(2)(i)(A). There are exceptions to this that
do not apply in the context of the windfall tax.
Regs. §1.901-2(b)(2)(i)(B)–(C).

previous reported cases and from anything the regulations appear to contemplate.
III
We begin with the fundamentals: the objective of
the foreign tax credit is to avoid double taxation in
fact of the same income. This conditions the §904(a)
limitation of the credit by the tax rate: what is credited is no more than the United States rate as applied
to the foreign income. But there is also the problem
of ensuring that the ‘‘base’’ to which the foreign tax
applies is the same as the base to which the United
States tax applies. The statutory limitation does not
ensure this; hence the question of the ‘‘creditability’’
of the foreign tax.
It is useful to compare the statutory foreign income
tax limitation with the parallel limitation governing
estate taxes. Section 2014(a) provides a credit against
the estate tax for ‘‘any estate, inheritance, legacy or
succession taxes actually paid to any foreign country.’’ Section 2014(b) provides a dual limitation on
this estate tax foreign tax credit. Section 2014(b)(2)
provides that the credit, with respect to all foreign
taxes, is limited to an amount which bears the same
ratio to the pre-credit tax as the foreign property bears
to the value of the entire gross estate. The foreign
property for these purposes must meet three criteria:
• It must be included in the gross estate (for U.S.
purposes);

• It must be situated in the foreign country (as defined under U.S. ‘‘situs’’ rules);

• It must actually be subject to the foreign tax.
Section 2014(b)(1) provides that the credit, with respect to any particular foreign tax, is limited to the
same ratio which property meeting these three criteria
(and the third with respect to the particular tax) bears
to all property subject to that tax.
The first limitation is a rate limitation, parallel to
the §904(a) limitation on the income tax credit, except
with the proviso that the base of the estate tax credit
is limited to property actually taxed by the foreign
country, while the income tax limit is determined exclusively by whether United States law recognizes income as ‘‘foreign source.’’ The second limitation in
§2014 is a base limitation. It necessarily applies not
only on a per-country, but also on a per-tax basis: one
can credit only that portion of any given tax payment
that the intersecting base — the amount actually subject to tax by both countries — constitutes of the entire tax base subjected to tax in the foreign country.
This is not to suggest, much less to advocate, the
importation of a limitation parallel to the estate tax
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limitation into the income tax foreign tax credit. Estate taxes are imposed only once with respect to any
given person, and the base of any inheritance or estate
tax is ordinarily far simpler to determine than the base
of the income tax of any person, much more so in the
case of a complex transnational corporation. The administration of such a credit in the income tax credit
would probably be impossible, as it would require a
sophisticated understanding by the tax authorities of
the provisions and application of the tax laws of an
enormous number of countries, with respect to an
enormous number of issues.
But the contrast between the income and estate tax
foreign tax credits does illumine a theoretical problem
with the income tax foreign tax credit and its attendant limitation. And that theoretical problem has
given rise to the general issue in the windfall tax
cases: the question when a foreign tax may be claimed
as a credit.
IV
When the question first presented itself, the Board
of Tax Appeals took a lenient view, allowing a credit
for a tax on whatever the foreign government ‘‘determines to be income.’’11 In Keen v. Commissioner,12
France imposed a tax on income, but computed income as seven times the rental value of the residence,
which was occupied by a taxpayer not domiciled in
France. The Board held:
Whatever may be the nature of the tax, it is
imposed upon what the French Government
determines to be income. . . . The fact that
under the law the taxable income is determined in a manner different from the taxable
income under the Revenue Act of 1921 does
not change the nature of the tax. The fact
that the net income of the petitioner as computed under the Revenue Act of 1921 was
much in excess of the income of the petitioner determined for the purposes of the
French tax does not change the character of
the tax paid.13
The Board thus explicitly rejected the significance
of two circumstances: first, the status of the tax ‘‘in
the U.S. sense’’; and second, the fact that the taxable
income so computed was substantially less than the
taxpayer’s taxable income for United States purposes,
computed under applicable United States law. In Ha11

Keen v. Commissioner, 15 B.T.A. 1243, 1246 (1929).
Id. at 1243.
13
Id. at 1243, 1246 (emphasis added).
12

vana Electric Railway, Light & Power Co. v. Commissioner,14 the Board reversed an earlier ruling based on
a clarification of the nature of the tax made in a Cuban Supreme Court ruling subsequent to the Board’s
earlier ruling. In both decisions, the Board gave near
conclusive weight to the characterization of the tax by
the foreign authority imposing it.
This approach changed after (not with) the 1938
decision of the Supreme Court in Biddle v. Commissioner.15 Biddle is a much misunderstood case, frequently hailed as the classic statement and ultimately
source of authority for the principle now enshrined in
the regulations, that to be creditable a tax must be an
income tax in a ‘‘United States sense.’’ But Biddle
does not stand for this proposition. Moreover, the case
was a result driven more by the ideology of its day
than by any fair or logical reading of the statute. As
such, it is probably wrongly decided and its holding
has had little practical application historically, and has
virtually none today.16
Biddle involved the United Kingdom’s gardenvariety imputation credit system. The United Kingdom, upon distributions by a corporation that had paid
corporate income tax, charged the distributee shareholders with a portion of that tax attributable to the
amount distributed, which was included in income,
and then allowed a credit for the tax ‘‘deemed paid.’’
A United States shareholder of a British corporation
who received an amount so distributed sought to
credit the amount so allowed by U.K. law against
United States tax under the foreign tax credit provision. The Bureau of Internal Revenue had historically
14

34 B.T.A. 782 (1936).
302 U.S. 573 (1938).
16
The discussion here of Biddle strays a bit beyond my essential purpose in this review of the pre-regulations case law; nothing in Biddle is really inconsistent with my general idea, that the
‘‘creditability’’ question is principally one of the relative congruence of the foreign tax base with the United States base. But if
contemporary comment is going to praise the decision in PPL as
a victory for both ‘‘taxpayers’’ and ‘‘tax administration’’ — with
observations such as ‘‘The Court saved Biddle v. Commissioner,
302 U.S. 573 (1938), from death by an overly formalistic test, perhaps one requiring that foreign jurisdictions invoke the magic
words ‘gross receipts’ or ‘gross income’ in enacting tax laws,’’ Sapirie, ‘‘PPL: A Victory for Substance over Form,’’ 2013 TNT
102-5 (5/28/13) — then perhaps this represents a propitious moment to set the record straight on precisely what Biddle was and
what it contributes in the modern era to either taxpayers or tax
administration, the whole matter reminding me a bit of the line in
the Randy Newman song ‘‘The Beehive State,’’ that ‘‘we’re going
to tell the whole country about Utah/Because nobody seems to
know.’’
More to the point, the background of Biddle and its relation to
administrative law is germane to the questions addressed in part
IX, and those raised by the recent Home Concrete and Mayo
Foundation decisions of the Court, as noted below at note 20.
15
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allowed the credit in these circumstances,17 but had
changed its position and now disallowed the credit.
The Supreme Court upheld the Bureau. It held:
Inclusion of the deducted amount in the base
on which surtax is calculated, together with
the provisions for refund of the tax to the
stockholder who, in any event, bears its economic burden, are logical recognitions of the
British conception that the standard tax paid
by the corporation is passed on to the stockholders.
Our revenue laws give no recognition to that
conception. Although the tax burden of the
corporation is passed on to its stockholders
with substantially the same results to them as
under the British system, our statutes take no
account of that fact in establishing the rights
and obligations of taxpayers. Until recently
they have not laid a tax, except surtax, on
dividends, but they have never treated the
stockholder for any purpose as paying the
tax collected from the corporation. Nor have
they treated as taxpayers those upon whom
no legal duty to pay the tax is laid. Measured by these standards our statutes afford
no scope for saying that the stockholder of a
British corporation pays the tax which is laid
upon and collected from the corporation, and
no basis for a decision that §131 extends to
such a stockholder a credit for a tax paid by
the corporation — a privilege not granted to
stockholders in our own corporations.18
Its passage most influential on later decisions suggested, but did not announce, the idea of testing foreign taxes to determine whether they were income
taxes in a ‘‘United States sense’’:
At the outset it is to be observed that decision must turn on the precise meaning of the
words in the statute which grants to the citizen taxpayer a credit for foreign ‘income
taxes paid.’ The power to tax and to grant
the credit resides in Congress, and it is the
will of Congress which controls the application of the provisions for credit. The expression of its will in legislation must be taken
to conform to its own criteria unless the statute, by express language or necessary implication, makes the meaning of the phrase
‘paid or accrued,’ and hence the operation
17
S.M. 3040, IV-1 C.B. 198; S.M. 5363, V-1 C.B. 89; I.T.
2401, VII-1 C. B. 126; GCM 3179, VII-1 C.B. 240.
18
Biddle v. Commissioner, 302 U.S. 573, 581 (1938).

of the statute in which it occurs, depend
upon its characterization by the foreign statutes and by decisions under them. Cf. Crew
Levick Co. v. Pennsylvania, 245 U.S. 292,
294; Weiss v. Weiner, 279 U.S. 333, 337;
Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U.S. 103, 110.
Section 131 does not say that the meaning of its
words is to be determined by foreign taxing statutes
and decisions, and there is nothing in its language to
suggest that in allowing the credit for foreign tax payments, a shifting standard was adopted by reference to
foreign characterizations and classifications of tax
legislation. The phrase ‘income taxes paid,’ as used in
our own revenue laws, has for most practical purposes
a well understood meaning to be derived from an examination of the statutes which provide for the laying
and collection of income taxes. It is that meaning
which must be attributed to it as used in §131.19
As to ideology, Biddle was decided in January
1938, only a few months after the first Justice appointed by President Roosevelt, Hugo Black, had
been confirmed, replacing Justice Van Devanter, one
of the ‘‘Four Horsemen’’ who had been implacably
opposed to the New Deal. The Black appointment had
triggered a bitter confirmation battle. That battle had
been preceded by a battle in early 1937 over President
Roosevelt’s famous ‘‘Court packing’’ plan, which had
been preceded in turn by a series of Supreme Court
decisions overturning legislation enacted as part of the
New Deal. Those decisions, in turn, reflected a 60- or
70-year pattern, in which the Supreme Court and
lower federal courts raised obstacles, under the due
process clause, the ‘‘dormant’’ commerce and admiralty clauses, and other provisions, to social welfare
legislation and the empowerment of administrative
agencies.
Biddle was a 6-3 decision. The opinion was written
by Justice Stone, one of the Court’s three pre-New
Deal liberals, and joined by the other two members of
this liberal bloc (Justices Cardozo and Brandeis), Justice Black, and the two center-right Justices (Chief
Justice Hughes and Justice Roberts), whose ‘‘switch
in time’’ (i.e., their transition from anti- to pro-New
Deal positions) had ‘‘saved nine’’ (i.e., helped to defeat the Court-packing scheme). The three remaining
members of the ‘‘Four Horsemen’’ (Justices McReynolds, Butler, and Sutherland) dissented, although by
this point they were too exhausted, or disgusted, by
the trend of decision to write an opinion.
In the period after World War II, the tax law became divorced from ideological conflicts over administrative procedures or judicial ‘‘activism,’’ and it be19

Id. at 578–79 (emphasis added).
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came conventional, if not de rigeur, to view prior law
from the vantage point of this divorce.20 But the income tax jurisprudence of the 1920s and 1930s was
not separate from the more general ideological quarrels, and in many respects it clouds, if it does not suppress, a proper understanding of the content of this
early precedent to regard that law otherwise. Justice
Stone’s opinion and the decision in Biddle were precursors of a period of harshly anti-taxpayer Supreme
Court decisions, which revised or overhauled earlier,
more moderate views — decisions such as Higgins v.
Smith,21 Helvering v. Hort,22 Helvering v. Bashford,23
Helvering v. Horst,24 Helvering v. Clifford,25 Anderson v. Helvering,26 even Moline Properties, Inc. v.
Commissioner.27 Biddle is an early avatar of the spirit
of this period. Many of these decisions — Bashford
and Higgins v. Smith, certainly, as well as Anderson
20

Of course, the last couple years have seen suggestions that
after the long divorce there perhaps should be a reconciliation.
These suggestions follow the Supreme Court’s decisions in Mayo
Foundation for Med. Educ. Research v. United States, 131 S. Ct.
704 (2011), and United States v. Home Concrete & Supply, LLC,
132 S. Ct. 1836 (2012), holding that deference to regulations under Chevron, U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Def. Council, 468 U.S.
836 (1984), applies to tax regulations as it does to the regulations
of agencies other than the IRS, and suggesting more generally that
general administrative law principles apply in the tax field as they
do to any other agency matters. The Mayo Foundation decision
was a government victory, and led the Chief Counsel of the Service two weeks after the decision to give a ‘‘Dragon Speech’’ to
the annual luncheon of the New York State Bar Association, holding that the decision had slain four ‘‘dragons’’ which impeded the
enforcement of tax regulations. Certain practitioners responded
with suggestions of how the Supreme Court’s invitation to apply
administrative law precepts more broadly in the tax field could be
exploited to tie the government’s hands (rendering Mayo Foundation something of a Pyrrhic victory). Smith, ‘‘Life After Mayo,’’
2011 TNT 119-2 (6/1/11); Salem, ‘‘Mayo Dissected: Some Dragons Slain, Some Still Breathing Fire,’’ Tax Notes (3/14/11), 2011
TNT 50-5. For a recent example of comment in the latter vein, respecting a transfer pricing issue, and, in my judgment, badly misconstruing Home Concrete, see ‘‘3M Could Succeed in Legal
Challenge of Transfer Pricing Regulation, Practitioner Says,’’
2013 TNT 118-5 (6/18/13) (reporting remarks of Mark R. Martin
of McDermott Will & Emery at ABA transfer pricing conference
in Miami, concerning a challenge by 3M Corporation, 3M Co. v.
Commissioner, No. 005816-13 (T.C. 2013), to Regs. §1.4821(h)(2)(i) and (ii), under Procter & Gamble Co. v. Commissioner,
95 T.C. 323 (1990), aff’d, 961 F.2d 1255 (6th Cir. 1992); Exxon
Corp. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 1993-616 (1993); and Commissioner v. First Security Bank of Utah, 405 U.S. 394 (1972)).
These suggestions should be borne in mind, too, in connection
with the considerations outlined in Part IX below.
21
308 U.S. 473 (1940).
22
313 U.S. 28 (1941).
23
302 U.S. 454 (1938).
24
311 U.S. 112 (1940).
25
309 U.S. 331 (1940).
26
301 U.S. 404 (1940).
27
319 U.S. 436 (1943).

and Clifford — became dead letters, either on account
of legislative change, administrative action, judicial
disinterest, or a combination of the three. Others, like
Moline Properties, however, lived on in influence.
Biddle would become one of these.
The second point, however, is that Biddle does not
hold the proposition frequently and carelessly imputed to it — that to qualify for the foreign tax credit,
a foreign tax must be an income tax ‘‘in the United
States sense.’’ The passage in Biddle cited for this
proposition are the two paragraphs quoted above.28
But those passages concern the term ‘‘income taxes
paid,’’ not the term ‘‘income tax’’; and they make
clear that what the Court is interpreting, is whether
the imputed or ‘‘deemed paid’’ tax is paid within the
meaning of the predecessor of §901. The United
Kingdom tax there in question was an income tax by
any standard and beyond any question. That the decision involved the nature of the payment, not the nature of the tax, is made clear, too, and notwithstanding the passage’s general reference to the ‘‘words of
the statute,’’ by Justice Stone’s exegesis of why the
mode of payment deemed by United Kingdom law
does not constitute ‘‘payment’’ under the foreign tax
credit provision.29
A third point is that a substantial argument can be
made that Biddle is wrongly decided, even on its own
terms. For it simply is not true, and was not true at
the time, that ‘‘[o]ur revenue laws give no recognition’’ to the ‘‘conception’’ of an imputation credit, or
that they in no way ‘‘treated the stockholder for any
purpose as paying the tax collected from the corporation.’’ The indirect credit does exactly this, and has
done so since 1918.
Finally, the actual result in Biddle has had and continues to have little practical application. Within seven
years of the decision, in 1945, the United States entered into a treaty with the United Kingdom under
which the United States agreed to allow the credit disallowed by Biddle. The United States has accorded
this treatment in other conventions with imputation
credit systems similar to that of the United Kingdom.
I have been unable to locate anyone who can assert
for certain that there are no conventions with any nations applying such a system that do not allow the
credit. But neither can I find anyone who knows of a
treaty with such a nation that does not allow the
credit, or even of a non-treaty country with such a
system where a credit is disallowed under Biddle.
On the other hand, the fact that Biddle does not
stand for the proposition that a tax must be an ‘‘income tax in the United States sense’’ is also of little
28
29

Biddle v. Commissioner, 302 U.S. 573, 578 (1938).
Id. at 578, 581–82.
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importance, because it was so read by a line of cases
following it, and those cases pretty clearly established
the principle, however much their reliance on Biddle
for it may have been misplaced.
V
The lower courts wasted little time extrapolating
from Biddle. In Keasbey & Mattison Co. v. Rothensies,30 the Court denied a credit for an Ontario mining
tax, which began with the gross value of output at the
time of sale or use, and did not allow deductions for
indirect costs. The Court said it was ‘‘conceded that
in the application of the statute the criteria prescribed
by our revenue laws are determinative of the meaning
of the term ‘income taxes’ as used therein,’’ citing
Biddle.31 The Court referred to the enactment of the
‘‘in lieu of’’ provision as ‘‘presumptive evidence that
Congress recognized that the prior act was of limited
application.’’32
Keasbey & Mattison was followed by other decisions adopting the principle thus imputed to Biddle. In
New York & Honduras Rosario Min. Co. v. Commis30

133 F.2d 894 (3d Cir. 1943).
Id. at 894, 897.
32
Id. at 894, 898. The Revenue Act of 1942, P.L. 77-753, 56
Stat. 798, enacted the predecessor of §903 of the Code, allowing
a credit for taxes imposed ‘‘in lieu of’’ income taxes. The enactment confirms the analysis, set forth in the text, of Biddle as a peculiar case of ‘‘anti-conservative’’ reaction by the late-New Dealera Court. During the so-called ‘‘Lochner era,’’ the progressive,
pro-welfare, pro-administration initiatives of the legislatures, at
the state level and of Congress, were tempered or frustrated by the
restrictive stance of the courts, couched often in terms of protecting private rights. By 1941, President Roosevelt had appointed
seven of the Supreme Court Justices. Also, in the midterm elections of 1938, the moderate-conservative coalition of Republicans
and Southern Democrats regained control of Congress for the first
time since 1930, control that coalition would hold for at least the
next 20 years. This led to a reversal of the roles of the earlier era.
The progressive, welfare- and administration-protective excesses
of this Court, often insensitive to or restrictive of private rights,
were frequently restrained or overturned by Congress, the leading
instance being the adoption of the middle ground Administrative
Procedure Act in 1946, 5 U.S.C. §551 et seq. (2006). The 1942
Revenue Act in general, and the adoption of §903, which was intended to limit Biddle, reflected this pattern as well. Its compromise nature, as well perhaps as the fact that it was enacted under
the exigencies of total war, has made the 1942 enactment one of
the most measured revenue enactments in the history of the Republic, and many of whose initiatives (like wage withholding and
the provisions governing employee health and pension benefits)
have long endured and become major elements not only of the tax
system but of the American economy as well.
The §903 provision, like many congressional efforts to restrain
an enthusiastically pro-administrative Judiciary, had limited impact, largely because the administration, and, more importantly,
the courts, largely ignored it. See note 39 below.
31

sioner,33 and Commissioner v. American Metal Co.,34
the Second Circuit reformulated the test by saying
that ‘‘the determinative question is ‘whether the foreign tax is the substantial equivalent of an ‘‘income
tax’’ as that term is understood in the United
States.’ ’’35
In Lanman & Kemp-Barclay & Co. v. Commissioner,36 the Tax Court denied a credit for the ‘‘patrimony’’ portion of a tax imposed by Colombia, which
was essentially a tax on assets. The Court said it was
‘‘well settled that the determination . . . is to be made
not upon the characterization of the foreign law, but
under the criteria established by the internal revenue
laws of the United States,’’ citing Biddle and Keasbey
& Mattison Co., and quoting American Metal Co.,
and stressed that ‘‘[t]he doctrine that only those increases in value of property which are actually realized by the owner constitute taxable income is basic
to the income tax system of the United States.’’37
In Bank of America v. United States,38 the Court of
Claims denied a credit for taxes imposed on the gross
interest income of banks by three less developed
countries: Argentina, Thailand, and the Philippines.
The court held that the ‘‘criteria of United States law’’
principle required that the foreign tax be calculated to
reach ‘‘net gain,’’ by allowing recovery of significant
costs and expenses; and that the taxes on gross income did not meet that condition, because it was possible in some circumstances that the tax would be imposed in a year when the bank suffered a net loss in
the country involved.39
33

168 F.2d 745 (2d Cir. 1948).
221 F.2d 134 (2d Cir. 1955).
35
Id., quoting New York & Honduras Rosario Min. Co. v. Commissioner, 168 F.2d 745, 747 (2d Cir. 1948).
36
26 T.C. 582 (1956).
37
Id. at 582, 588 (emphasis added).
38
459 F.2d 513 (1972).
39
The Bank of America decision was an aggressive application
of the prior principles in any event. The United States itself imposes gross income taxes, in the form of withholding taxes, as do
most developed countries, and it would be quite troubling, from
the standpoint of the international treaty network and long accepted international tax norms, to question whether those could be
credited against home country tax. These taxes are deemed by the
current regulations as acceptable substitutes for taxes which expressly seek to define ‘‘net gain.’’ And the Bank of America Court
ignored §903, the ‘‘in lieu of’’ provision, notwithstanding that the
legislative history from 1942 seemed to contemplate coverage of
precisely the type of tax at issue before the Bank of America
Court:
34

Your committee believes further amendments should
be made in section 131. Under that section as it now
stands, a credit is allowed against United States tax for
income, war profits or excess profits taxes paid or accrued to any foreign country or to any possession of
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In the 1970s, the Saudi oil rulings,40 and the credits based on ‘‘posted prices,’’ became the dominant issue in relation to the foreign tax credit, and it would
become a focus of general political, in addition to professional tax community, attention. This focus led to
the development of the current regulations. The process of developing them was a long and arduous one,
begun in 1977 and not completed until after a change
in administrations in 1983. The post-Biddle case law
is the inspiration of the most significant elements of
the regulations. That law was the source of authority
for the principle that a tax must be an income tax ‘‘in
the United States sense,’’ and that this meant that the
tax has to be ‘‘likely to reach net gain in the ordinary
circumstances to which it applies.’’41 Keasbey & Mattheson, Lanham, and Bank of America, too, are the
sources, respectively, for the three characteristics
which under the regulations determine whether an income tax is ‘‘reasonably calculated to reach net gain.’’
Keasbey & Mattheson is the authority (or inspiration)
for the ‘‘gross receipts’’ requirement; Lanham and
American Metal for the ‘‘realization’’ requirement;
and Bank of America for the ‘‘allowance of significant
costs and expenses’’ requirement.
VI
There remain a considerable range of policy disputes about the provisions of these regulations. The
point to stress here, however, is that the cases and
regulations both clearly base the determination on an
examination of the foreign base, without taking into
account the foreign rate, and in this regard they are
clearly on the right track. This is true, as far as I
the United States. In the interpretation of the term income tax, the Commissioner, the Board, and the courts
have consistently adhered to a concept of income tax
rather closely related to our own, and if such foreign
tax was not imposed upon a basis corresponding approximately to net income it was not recognized as a
basis for such credit. Thus if a foreign country in imposing income taxation authorized, for reasons growing out of the administrative diffıculties of determining
net income or taxable basis within that country, a
United States domestic corporation doing business in
such country to pay a tax in lieu of such income tax
but measured, for example, by gross income, gross
sales or a number of units produced within the country, such tax has not heretofore been recognized as a
basis for a credit. Your committee has deemed it desirable to extend the scope of this section.
S. Rep. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 131–32 (emphasis
added).
40
Rev. Rul. 55-296, 1955-1 C.B. 386, revoked, Rev. Rul. 7863, 1978-1 C.B. 228.
41
Regs. §1.901-2(a)(3)(i).

know, of all decisions in this area prior to the Tax
Court’s PPL decision and the Fifth Circuit’s in Entergy, now affirmed by the Supreme Court’s PPL decision. As detailed above, those decisions accept a tax
the base of which can be and frequently is greatly in
excess of the United States base, and look to the relatively low rate of the tax to defend its qualification for
the credit. In this regard, they depart from all prior decisions as well as from the regulations.
The link of the conception of creditability to the
question of ‘‘tax base intersection’’ can be examined
by looking to the provisions of the regulations concerning ‘‘dual capacity taxpayers.’’ The regulations
provide that, prior to determining whether a ‘‘levy’’
constitutes an ‘‘income tax,’’ one must first determine
whether the levy constitutes a ‘‘tax.’’ They provide
that if a taxpayer receives a ‘‘specific economic benefit’’ (SEB) in connection with the levy, the levy is a
charge for the benefit, and not a tax. They also provide that if the levy is both an exaction for general
revenue purposes and a charge for a ‘‘specific economic benefit,’’ the taxpayer is a ‘‘dual capacity taxpayer’’ (DCTP) and the ‘‘qualifying levy’’ (QL) must
be split between a portion that is a charge for the benefit (which is ordinarily a deductible expense, rather
than a creditable tax) and the portion that is a creditable tax. And the regulations provide that the amount
of each portion is determined either by a ‘‘facts and
circumstances’’ test, or under a safe harbor.
The regulations provide a formula for the safe harbor as follows:
(11)

D
C t = (A - B - C) # [ 1 - D ]

where C represents the total payment under the
qualifying levy (QL) in question; Ct represents what
is being determined, viz., the portion of C that is allowable as a creditable ‘‘tax’’; D represents the foreign tax rate; A represents gross receipts for purposes
of the foreign levy; and B represents allowable deductions.42 It is with respect to A and B that the regulations make special provision. They provide, in perhaps the most prolix fashion known to the English
language, that ‘‘if provisions of the qualifying levy increase or decrease the liability imposed on dual capacity taxpayers compared to the general tax liability
of persons other than dual capacity taxpayers by reason of the determination or treatment of gross receipts
or of costs and expenses, the provisions generally applicable in computing such other persons’ tax base under the general tax shall apply to determine gross receipts and costs and expenses for purposes of comput42

Regs. §1.901-2A(e)(1).
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ing the qualifying amount.’’43 In other words, if there
is a discrepancy between the ‘‘base’’ of the QL as applied to DCTPs and the ‘‘base’’ of the QL as applied
to non-DCTPs, the formula applies using the base as
applied to non-DCTPs.
We will not care, for purposes of our discussion,
whether this discrepancy arises from the treatment of
gross receipts, on the one hand, or costs and expenses,
on the other. So let us designate the amount of the
base discrepancy as X. Now we know that:
(12)
C = D (A − B + X)
We also know that:
(13)
C = C t + Cr
where Cr represents the portion of the QL payments
that is a ‘‘royalty,’’ or other payment for a specific
economic benefit (SEB).
If we plug equation (13) into equation (11), we get:
(14)

or:
(15)

D
C t = (A - B - C t - C r) # [ 1 - D ]
D Dk #
D
a1 + : 1 C t = (A - B - C r) # [ 1 - D ]
D

and that resolves to:
(16)
Ct = (A − B − Cr) × D
Now make one further assumption, that the base as
computed for purposes of the QL as applied to nonDCTPs is the same as the base for purposes of United
States law. In these circumstances, equation (6) gives
a formula for the amount creditable which is the same
amount that would be generated by a rule parallel to
the ‘‘base limitation’’ of the estate tax (§2014(b)(1)):
their rate, times our base (i.e., our determination of
what the intersection of the base as we and as they
define it).
This may be easier if we plug numbers into the
equations. The numbers are drawn from an example
in the regulations.44 Assume that A is 120u, B is 30u,
D is 40%; and that the ‘‘royalty’’ element is generated
by the disallowance of costs and benefits of 10u.
Thus, X is 10u, and, according to equation (2), C is
40u. Plugging in equation (11), Ct, the amount creditable is 120u, minus 30u, minus 40u (or 50u), multiplied by 2⁄3, or 331⁄3u. This is equivalent to, plugging
in equation (16), (120u, minus 30u, minus 62⁄3u) (or
831⁄3u) (‘‘our base’’), times 40% (‘‘their rate’’).45

43

Regs. §1.901-2A(e)(2).
Regs. §1.901-2A(e)(8), Ex. 1.
45
The need to account for the deductibility of the ‘‘royalty’’ is
why one cannot simply multiply the foreign tax rate times the
base discrepancy to determine the amount not allowed as a credit.
In the example, that would generate a ‘‘royalty’’ of 4u and a creditable tax of 36u, but that is too great a tax allowance if the de44

VII
Apart from the question of the ‘‘outliers,’’ and the
question whether the ‘‘base’’ of the windfall tax generally reached only profits earned by the taxpayers
prior to imposition of the tax, there were two other
major arguments against allowing a credit for the tax.
Both were identified by the Alstott-Graetz amicus
brief.46 Neither is mentioned in any of the judicial
opinions concerning the windfall tax.
The first was the question whether the windfall tax
was a ‘‘tax’’ for purposes of the regulations. The
Alstott-Graetz brief suggests that the windfall tax can
be construed as a payment to the government for the
specific economic benefit of charging a premium over
market prices, and suggests that such a right is
‘‘within the ambit of the general definition of’’ the
term ‘‘specific economic benefit,’’ as used in the regulations. Other arguments could be made in relation to
the ‘‘specific economic benefit’’ idea — in particular,
that, to the extent the tax was a partial addition to the
flotation price, it was imposed in exchange for the
shareholders’ acquisition of the assets involved.47
A variant of the argument would be to treat the
windfall tax as imposed partly in the United Kingdom’s taxing capacity and partly as a compulsory
payment for a specific economic benefit. An Appendix sets forth the manner in which the safe harbor
‘‘splitting’’ rule of Regs. §1.901-2A would apply to a
hypothetical taxpayer subject to the windfall tax,
which enjoyed average annual profits at a rate of 50%
of ‘‘flotation value’’ over the four-year test period
(and thus generated a windfall profits base in excess
of its aggregate profits for the four-year period).
The second argument is that the purely retroactive
‘‘one-off’’ character of the windfall tax alone destroys
its qualification for a foreign tax credit. The AlstottGraetz amicus brief argues this point on two grounds:
first, the United States income and windfall profits
taxes, enacted since 1913, have always been prospecduction for the ‘‘royalty’’ is to be taken into account.
46
Brief of Anne Alstott, Marvin Chirelestein, Mihir Desai, Michael Graetz, Daniel Halperin, Mitchell Kane, Lawrence Lokken,
Robert Peroni, and Alvin Warren as Amici Curiae. The brief is reproduced at 2013 TNT 19-23 (1/18/13). The Supreme Court cites
the brief as ‘‘Brief of Alstott et al.’’ The brief is signed by an attorney and by Michael Graetz, one of the amici. The brief is referred to as the ‘‘Alstott-Graetz brief’’ herein.
47
As the amicus brief argues, ‘‘[t]he fact that the payment obligation arose after the granting of the economic benefit should not
be dispositive,’’ because if ‘‘the levy would be non-creditable if
assessed during the initial period we do not see how that defect
could be cured simply by delaying the timing of the imposition of
the levy, given that it applies only to those parties who received
the specific economic benefit.’’ Alstott-Graetz Brief, above note
46, 2013 TNT 19–23 (1/18/13).
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tive; second, that those taxes have always been assessed based upon an annual accounting period, with
a citation to Burnet v. Sanford & Brooks Co.,48 the Supreme Court decision articulating the proposition that
this feature of the United States income tax is a fundamental one. As to the latter characteristic, the brief
asserts that to be creditable a foreign tax must have
this feature, notwithstanding that no such requirement
is explicitly set forth in the regulations:
Surely the requirement of ‘net gain’ in the
‘normal circumstances of its operations in
which it applies’ under 26 C.F.R. section
1.901-2(a)(3)(i) of the regulations implies
the crucial income tax role of an annual accounting period; otherwise, it would not be
describing a tax ‘with the predominant character of an income tax.’ This point is so
clear that it was not essential for Treasury to
restate it explicitly in the regulations. In contrast, the UK windfall tax was imposed onetime only on the shortfall in flotation values.49
I am far less certain that any such requirement is
implicit in the regulations. The regulations say that a
tax is likely to reach net gain in the normal circumstances to which the tax applies ‘‘if and only if’’ the
three characteristics listed in the regulations obtain.
As I suggest above, Keasbey & Mattheson, Lanham,
and Bank of America, respectively, together support
the position that a foreign levy is an income tax ‘‘only
if’’ the three listed characteristics obtain: each of
those cases disqualifies a tax based on the absence of
one of the three characteristics. But neither collectively nor separately do those cases support the ‘‘if’’
prong of the regulations. The regulations nevertheless
plainly adopt that prong as part of their rule, and do
with evident consciousness of the issue. Thus, the
regulations appear, at least to me, to foreclose the possibility that characteristics of the United States income tax other than the three listed features could be
deemed crucial to allowing a credit for the tax.
Nevertheless, the argument has considerable force,
not the least on account of the fact that the most ‘‘perverse incentives,’’ to use the phrase of the amicus
brief, would flow from allowing a credit for a nonperiodic, ‘‘one-off,’’ purely retroactive tax. As I suggested in my earlier article, there may be linguistic
gynmastics by which one could find that the regulations imply this requirement; or, following the amicus
brief’s suggestion one could treat the matter as so

‘‘clear’’ that there was no reason to mention it in the
regulations. If these are not availing, however, the
matter is of sufficient logical and policy seriousness as
to raise a question about the validity of the ‘‘if’’ prong
of the regulations, which, as I suggest above, does not
appear to have support in the pre-regulations case law.
In any event, the matter is not mentioned in the Supreme Court’s decision.
VIII
As noted, the conclusion of the amicus brief suggests that allowing a credit for the windfall tax, by
‘‘treating a one-time retroactive tax on differences in
value’’ as creditable, ‘‘would provide a roadmap for
foreign governments to shift the costs of acquiring
privatized assets away from the owners of these assets
to the U.S. fisc and American taxpayers.’’50 Indeed,
the approval of a credit for a tax with that feature creates at least possibilities for foreign governments to
‘‘tap into’’ the U.S. fisc, and United States taxpayers,
even outside a privatization context. A tax like the
windfall tax could be used for a partial nationalization
of an enterprise, regulated or not, that never was in
government hands. Indeed, it is not clear, if periodicity and prospectivity are not deemed to be fundamental features of an income tax ‘‘in a United States
sense,’’ why a foreign government could not wait until after results were in, examine a company’s returns
for a past period, and retroactively impose a tax on its
‘‘income,’’ as defined for United States purposes. The
company would then pay the tax and could secure reimbursement through a foreign tax credit claim in the
United States.
There is a question, however, whether the Supreme
Court’s opinion has this consequence, because the Supreme Court did not explicitly address whether the
retroactive, nonperiodic aspect of the tax defeats its
creditability. Ordinarily, if such a tax were imposed by
a foreign sovereign and a credit claimed for it, the
PPL decision would stand as authority for its creditability, because this feature of the later tax would be
indistinguishable from the windfall tax allowed as a
credit by PPL. The question is the extent to which
Footnote 6 of the Court’s opnion changes this. Footnote 6 says that, notwithstanding that the argument
there identified is crucial to the disposition of the issue the Court decided, the Court expresses no view as
to the merits of the argument. Justice Sotomayor
agrees that the Court should not address an argument
raised only by amici.
United States lawyers may be called upon to advise
both companies and foreign governments concerning

48

282 U.S. 359, 364 (1931)
Alstott-Graetz brief, above, note 46, 2013 TNT 19–23
(1/18/13).
49

50

Id.
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the eligibility of future tax proposals or enacted taxes
for the U.S. foreign tax credit. They will have to
grapple with the implications of Footnote 6, for these
and other issues seemingly decided though not addressed by the Court’s opinion.
IX
The difficulty with Footnote 6 derives from the distinction between an issue and an argument. It is understood that if a litigant does not properly preserve
an issue on appeal, its right to raise the issue, or any
aspect of it, is waived. The same is not true of various
arguments as to an issue that is properly preserved on
appeal. A litigant is not required to preserve arguments. Once an issue is properly before it, an appellate court should take into account any argument that
may be dispositive of the issue. If it does not, the status of its precedent will be clouded, because the decision will be interpreted in light of all the facts of the
case, and subsequent cases presenting similar or identical facts will be subject to analysis based on the decision the appellate court renders. There is a matter of
fairness to the side opposing the newly introduced argument. But an appellate court has devices available
to it to protect litigants against surprise, including delay of its decision, rebriefing or reargument, or, in serious cases, remand to a lower court.
This is what makes Footnote 6 disquieting. The
‘‘argument’’ to which the footnote refers is one which
would dispose of the issue before the Court. Yet the
Court says that, because it was not properly ‘‘preserved,’’ the Court does not address its merits. Justice
Sotomayor agrees, on the basis of a ‘‘principle’’ that
the Court should not ordinarily address an argument
pressed only by amici.
And the matter is compounded because there are
the other two issues, equally dispositive of the case,
also raised only by amici, which will be present in any
later case presenting similar facts.
Compounding these difficulties is the fact that the
author of the Court’s opinion is Justice Thomas —
and Justice Thomas, in certain opinions issued early
in this century, takes a particular view either of tax adjudication generally, or of the interpretation of revenue regulations in particular, never adopted by the
full Court. The PPL decision, however, may reflect
those views, and to the extent it does, it raises questions about the Court’s overall approach to tax cases,
or at least to the interpretation of regulations, and
raises questions about how the Court’s precedents are
to be interpreted in later cases, especially where interpretation of regulations is involved.

Justice Thomas authored the Court’s decision in
Gitlitz v. Commissioner.51 The decision involved the
question whether, when an S corporation has cancellation of indebtedness income that is excluded under
§108(a) of the Code, the taxpayer is entitled nevertheless to include the amount of the income in the basis
of its shares. The Service, Tax Court, and Court of
Appeals had held that the taxpayer could not include
the amount in the basis of the shares. The Supreme
Court reversed, in language that has had considerable
influence, including influence on the Revenue Service:
[C]ourts have discussed the policy concern
that, if shareholders were permitted to pass
through the discharge of indebtedness before
reducing any tax attributes, the shareholders
would wrongly experience a ‘‘double windfall’’: They would be exempted from paying
taxes on the full amount of the discharge of
indebtedness, and they would be able to increase basis and deduct their previously suspended losses. [Citation omitted]. Because
the Code’s plain text permits the taxpayers
here to receive these benefits, we need not
address this policy concern. [Footnote
omitted].52
In two later decisions, Justice Thomas authored
separate opinions in which he expressed views,
which, like this passage from Gitlitz, suggested that
courts should interpret tax laws (or at least tax regulations) strictly against the tax administration. The
first is United Dominion Industries, Inc. v. United
States,53 which involved the interpretation of provisions of the consolidated return regulations governing
the special 10-year carryback of ‘‘specified liability’’
losses. The Court eschewed the government’s interpretation of the consolidated return regulations. In
51

531 U.S. 206 (2001).
Id. at 206, 219–20 (2001). Gitlitz was before PPL the most
recent opinion for the Court in a tax case authored by Justice
Thomas. Paradoxically, in that case, too, the government, in the
Court’s word ‘‘abandoned’’ an ‘‘argument’’ that had been adopted
by the Court of Appeals. The Court said it found the abandonment
‘‘odd,’’ because that argument ‘‘predominated in the Commissioner’s argument to the Court of Appeals,’’ and that ‘‘[n]
otwithstanding the Commissioner’s attempt at oral argument to
distance himself from the reasoning of the Court of Appeals on
this issue — the Commissioner represented to us that the Court of
Appeals developed its reading of the statute sua sponte, Tr. of Oral
Arg. 22–24, 27 — it [was] apparent from the Commissioner’s
brief in the Court of Appeals that the Commissioner supplied the
very sequencing theory that the Court of Appeals adopted.’’ 531
U.S. 219 n.8. In Gitlitz, the Court addressed, and rejected the unargued argument. In contrast to PPL, there was not even an amicus advancing the argument before the Supreme Court.
53
532 U.S. 822 (2001).
52

Tax Management International Journal

subsidiary of The Bureau of National Affairs, Inc.
姝 2013 Tax Management Inc., aISSN
0090-4600

611

ARTICLES
dissent, Justice Stevens argued that as a general matter ‘‘when a provision of the Code and the corresponding regulations are ambiguous, this Court
should defer to the Government’s interpretation.’’54
Justice Thomas wrote a brief separate concurring
opinion for the sole purpose of responding to Justice
Stevens’ position (something which, apparently, Justice Souter’s opinion for the Court refrained from doing).
Justice Thomas disagreed with the dissent, arguing
that ‘‘[a]t a bare minimum, in cases such as this one,
in which the complex statutory and regulatory scheme
lends itself to any number of interpretations, we
should be inclined to rely on the traditional canon that
construes revenue-raising laws against their
drafter.’’55 Justice Thomas quoted an ancient Missouri
decision, Leavall v. Blades,56 to the effect that
‘‘[w]hen the tax gatherer puts his finger on the citizen,
he must also put his finger on the law permitting it,’’
and four Supreme Court precedents.57 It is ambiguous
precisely what Justice Thomas here means by a ‘‘bare
minimum’’: he may be suggesting that the construction against the revenue gatherer may be applicable
beyond cases involving the interpretation of a regulation; alternatively, he may be suggesting that in such
cases, the presumption against the government should
be stronger than a mere ‘‘construction against’’ the
government position.
Boeing Co. v. United States58 involved the interpretation of regulations governing the allocation of research and experimental deductions in the context of
54

Id. at 822.
Id. at 822, 838–39.
56
237 Mo. 695, 700–701, 141 S.W. 893, 894 (1911).
57
He also cited United States v. Merriam, 263 U.S. 179 (1923)
(‘‘If the words are doubtful, the doubt must be resolved against
the Government and in favor of the taxpayer’’); Bowers v. New
York & Albany Literage Co., 273 U.S. 346, 350, (1927) (‘‘The
provision is part of a taxing statute; and such laws are to be interpreted liberally in favor of the taxpayers’’); American Net &
Twine Co. v. Worthington, 141 U.S. 468, 474 (1891); Benziger v.
United States, 192 U.S. 38 (1904).
Justice Stevens in the dissent was in turn not altogether uncomfortable with at least limited application of Justice Thomas’s view.
Justice Stevens conceded that Justice Thomas ‘‘accurately points
to a tradition of cases construing ‘revenue-raising laws’ against
their drafter,’’ but said that ‘‘when the ambiguous provision in
question is not one that imposes tax liability but rather one that
crafts an exception from a general revenue duty for the benefit of
some taxpayers, a countervailing tradition suggests that the ambiguity should be resolved in the government’s favor.’’ 532 U.S. at
839 n.1 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Thus, Justice Thomas’s (and later Justice Scalia’s) position in
some measure has some general approval among the Justices. Neither Justice Souter’s opinion in United Dominion, nor any other
opinion for the Court has expressly disclaimed, limited, or criticized it.
58
537 U.S. 437 (2003).
55

domestic international sales corporations (DISCs).
Justice Stevens authored the opinion of a 7-2 majority
upholding the government’s interpretation of its regulations. Justice Thomas authored a dissent, joined by
Justice Scalia. The dissenting opinion began by reaffirming the views the Justice had expressed in his concurrence in United Dominion Industries, with the observation that ‘‘[b]efore placing its hand in the taxpayer’s pocket, the Government must place its finger on
the law authorizing its action,’’ citing his opinion in
United Dominion Industries, and quoting parenthetically the language from Leavell v. Blades.59
It is possible to see the approach of the Court in
PPL, and in Footnote 6 in particular, as a facet, if not
a corollary of the approach suggested by Justice
Thomas in the separate opinions in Boeing and United
Dominion Industries (and most likely underlying the
opinion for the Court in Gitlitz as well). The refusal
to entertain an argument not properly, carefully, precisely preserved by the government as tax collector,
much less one reliance on which the government affirmatively disclaimed at oral argument, can be seen
as an adjunct of an approach that is disposed to rule
for a taxpayer unless the government places its ‘‘finger’’ on the law authorizing its action (in placing its
‘‘hand’’ in the taxpayer’s ‘‘pocket’’). Corroborating
this view, strongly, is a passage, discussing the nondecided argument, from the oral argument, the very
point at which the government made clear it was not
relying on the ‘‘outlier’’ argument. In the discussion
at oral argument of the amicus’s ‘‘argument,’’ the
Chief Justice echoed the stance of Justices Thomas
and Scalia in Boeing, in suggesting the Supreme
Court should not ‘‘do a better job of getting money
from people than the IRS does’’:
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: We had a lot
of — your friend had a lot of questions on
the different periods, the initial periods and
changing the D value and what that did to
the — that is not an argument that you’ve
made, is it?
MS. O’CONNELL: That’s right. I think we
generally agree with the Petitioner that a tax
is — is either an income tax or not an in59
Id. at 437, 457 (2003). Justice Thomas’s views could have
been interpreted as questioning whether Chevron deference should
be accorded to tax regulations, because he did not confine his suggestion to circumstances where judicial review applies only to an
agency’s interpretation of its own regulations. Any such inference
would appear to be destroyed by Justice Thomas’s concurrence in
the Court’s later unanimous opinion in Mayo Foundation for Med.
Educ. Research v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 704 (2011), and in the
plurality opinion of Justice Breyer in United States v. Home Concrete & Supply, LLC, 132 S. Ct. 1836 (2012). See also note 20
above.
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come tax for everybody that [is] subject to
the tax and that you look at it in the normal
circumstances in which it applies. But I do
completely agree that the fact that the D figure changes makes this — just reinforces the
idea that the substance of this tax —
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Well, but that
is — again, that’s not an argument you’ve
made.
MS. O’CONNELL: No, but our the amicus
did make it. I mean, that —
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Well, the amicus did, but I don’t think we should do a
better job of getting money from people than
the IRS does.
MS. O’CONNELL: Well, the point is that —
the fact that there is a D variable there
shows that what parliament was trying to do
was to place an annual earnings figure on
each company to create a value for it. A
company — it’s not similar to an excess
profits tax in that way, that where a company
that operated for only six months is paying
the tax at the same level that a company
would be that was making profits at the
same rate for the entire four-year period.
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: No, that’s a
good articulation of the argument you
haven’t made.60
These past positions of Justice Thomas, taken together with the Chief Justice’s observations, raise a
couple of interesting questions, both about the Court’s
future tax jurisprudence and about the future application of the PPL decision. The first is whether and the
extent to which the Court is adopting a principle of
strict construction of the tax against the government.
The refusal to consider the ‘‘outlier’’ issue and the explicit statement in Footnote 6 that the Court was not
considering the ‘‘merits’’ of that ‘‘argument’’ suggest
that this is the approach the Court is at least implicitly
taking. This is reinforced by the other arguments of
the amici, which to me appear to be substantial if not
strong arguments. Indeed, I believe PPL is a surprising decision in light of the regulations, prior case law,
and, as I described above, the essential functioning of
the foreign tax credit as a substitute for an explicit
‘‘base limitation.’’
The second question concerns the scope of the PPL
decision itself. Lawyers applying or interpreting the
decision will have, as I suggested above, to grapple
60

A transcript of the oral argument is at 2013 TNT 35-15
(2/21/13) (emphasis added).

with the question of the extent to which the decision
decides arguments not explicitly addressed by the
Court’s opinion. The question of the ‘‘outliers’’ is one
of these; I suppose it is clear enough from the opinion
that this matter was not decided by the Court. But issues arising from the fact that the tax base in the case
for most companies covered exceeded past profits for
the periods identified by the tax; from the purely retroactive and nonperiodic nature of the tax; and from
the fact that the exaction could be seen as in exchange
for a ‘‘specific economic benefit’’ were not addressed
at all. The Court did not say it was not passing on
their merits, and the case would seem to stand as precedent with respect to them.
Apart from this, the Court’s flirtation with strict
construction of the tax positions of the government
raises intriguing questions concerning the response of
government litigants — both the Service and the Justice Department — to such a development, especially
to the extent the development by the Court is a largely
silent or muted one. Boeing notwithstanding, the government has not fared well in the Supreme Court tax
decisions in recent years, at least outside the context
of employment tax cases.61 The government was
plainly unenthusiastic about the Supreme Court’s
hearing the windfall tax cases: the government did not
seek review of the decision it lost, in the Fifth Circuit,
in Entergy Corp. v. Commissioner.62 A number of
quarters have criticized or questioned the government’s decision to ‘‘drop’’ the ‘‘outlier’’ argument at
oral argument, or still more its failure to raise the
other issues, including the ‘‘tax’’ qualification and retroactivity questions. Indeed, the Alstott-Graetz amicus
brief all but implies some criticism of this sort of the
government’s approach.
But this restrained approach may have in the end
benefited the government, and indeed the government
may have shrewdly understood all along that matters
might eventuate this way. Justice Sotomayor, too, by
concurring rather than dissenting, and articulating a
stance of restraint about arguments advanced by
amici, may have exercised a wisdom superficially belied by her outwardly club-footed anticipation of ‘‘another day’’ or ‘‘context.’’ By withholding solid arguments, the government (and by eschewing a dissent,
Justice Sotomayor) may have avoided a precedent that
might have rejected those arguments, on however substantial grounds, foreclosing the possibility of their in61
Mayo Corporation and United States v. Cleveland Indians
Baseball Company, 532 U.S. 200 (2001), are both 21st century
taxpayer victories in the Supreme Court. Both involved employment taxes (the question whether certain individuals should be
characterized as ‘‘employees,’’ rather than independent contractors, under the federal contributions statutes).
62
683 F.3d 233 (5th Cir. 2012).
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vocation in the future. Instead, moreover, the government (and perhaps Justice Sotomayor) secured an
opinion that all but concedes its incompleteness, and
affirmatively leaves open the possibility of raising
those arguments in the future, even in a case involving the same foreign tax and thus presenting virtually
identical facts.
And this speculation sheds some light on the dangers or difficulties of the ‘‘finger on the law’’ approach
in modern circumstances: it is easy for the tax administration to ‘‘game’’ the anticipation of that approach,
and to exploit it repeatedly to limit the judiciary’s capacity for comprehensively ruling on and controlling
the content of the tax law. This becomes more emphatically the case to the extent the doctrine is practiced sub silentio but not espoused by the Supreme
Court, so that the lower courts adopt it only sporadically or not at all. Thus, what might have been an appealing and even effective approach in the pastoral
Show Me State of the early 20th century may have
only untoward and counterproductive consequences if
applied broadly to the complex realities of modern industrial America.
One government official has publicly expressed
skepticism, since the announcement of the decision,
about whether the decision will have a broad or last-

ing impact on the foreign tax credit generally.63 At the
same time, the PPL decision appears to be a very liberal one with respect to allowing foreign tax credits,
and to open questions about the creditability of taxes
the qualification of which, prior to the decision, would
have been subject to serious doubt. At the same time,
the Court’s stated restraint from deciding a major argument presented to it suggests substantial grounds
for viewing the decision as limited, perhaps even to
its own facts.
But whatever the consequences for the foreign tax
credit, which in my judgment are unlikely to be salutary, the case may have broader impact — or may be
part of a pattern of decision or approach — by its implications for judicial approaches to interpretive questions in tax cases. Justice Thomas’s stance in Footnote
6, in light of his prior opinions and especially in light
of the position of the Chief Justice at oral argument,
suggest this may be what the future holds.
63

See ‘‘PPL Decision Unlikely to Have Broad Impact, IRS Official Says,’’ 2013 TNT 124-5 (6/27/13) (remarks of Barbara
Felker, Chief, Branch 3, Office of the Associate Chief Counsel
(International)).
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